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Abstract—In this paper, we focus on the physical layer secu-
rity for a K-user multiple-input-single-output (MISO) wiretap
channel in the presence of a malicious eavesdropper, where we
propose several interference exploitation (IE) precoding schemes
for different types of the eavesdropper. Specifically, in the case
where a common eavesdropper decodes the signal directly and
Eve’s full channel state information (CSI) is available at the
transmitter, we show that the required transmit power can be
further reduced by re-designing the ‘destructive region’ of the
constellations for symbol-level precoding and re-formulating the
power minimization problem. We further study the SINR bal-
ancing problems with the derived ‘complete destructive region’
with full, statistical and no Eve’s CSI, respectively, and show that
the SINR balancing problem becomes non-convex with statistical
or no Eve’s CSI. On the other hand, in the presence of a
smart eavesdropper using maximal likelihood (ML) detection, the
security cannot be guaranteed with all the existing approaches.
To this end, we further propose a random jamming scheme (RJS)
and a random precoding scheme (RPS), respectively. To solve the
introduced convex/non-convex problems in an efficient manner,
we propose an iterative algorithm for the convex ones based on
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, and deal with the
non-convex ones by resorting to Taylor expansions. Simulation
results show that all proposed schemes outperform the existing
works in secrecy performance, and that the proposed algorithm
improves the computation efficiency significantly.
Index Terms—MU-MISO, physical layer security, jamming,
symbol-level precoding, destructive region.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 5G wireless communications, there has been an ever-growing demand for the high-speed, huge-capacity, high-
efficiency, and secure communications [1]. Due to the broad-
cast nature of the wireless signals, wireless communications
are naturally facing various security threats. Traditionally, key-
based cryptographic techniques are usually employed at the
upper layers to conceal information to protect the information
signals from the wiretap of the potential eavesdroppers [2]-
[4]. More recently, physical layer security, as a supplementary
technique, has been proposed by Wyner in [5] to protect the
information signals from the perspective of information theory,
which utilizes the channel characteristics to design the security
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schemes and has then received extensive research attention [6]-
[8].
One of the most popular approaches for realizing physical
layer security is the jamming scheme, which is also called
artificial noise (AN) scheme. If the transmitter knows the
channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate user, the
jamming signals can be designed in the null space of the legit-
imate channel to confuse the eavesdropper without interfering
the legitimate transmission. For example, in [9], the jamming
signal sent by the receiver in a new channel training (CT)
phase was designed for security. The authors in [10] studied
the secure downlink transmission scheme with the help of a
cooperative jammer fighting against multiple eavesdroppers.
In [11], we have proposed a jamming-rate splitting scheme to
achieve more secure degrees of freedom for aK-user multiple-
input-single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with imperfect
CSI at transmitter. Apart from jamming, there are also a great
amount of endeavors devoted to designing precoding schemes
to improve transmission secrecy [12]–[16]. For example, in
[12], secure precoding was devised to protect the energy
harvesting network, where the precoding matrix was achieved
from the secrecy rate maximization problem. The authors in
[13] investigated the design of directional hybrid digital and
analog precoding for the multiuser mmwave communication
system with multiple eavesdroppers. Moreover, in [15] and
[16], the authors proposed a low-complexity algorithm to
optimize the secure precoding for a simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer network.
Instead of treating the jamming signals or the interference as
a detrimental effect at the intended receiver, another technique
to manage interference for the intended receivers in physical
layer security is interference alignment. For instance, the au-
thors in [17] and [18] proposed to align the jamming signal to
the receiving space of the eavesdroppers in multiuser networks,
which makes the attackers hard to intercept the signals even
with enough number of antennas. For the intended receiver, the
jamming signals are aligned to an independent dimension of
the information signals, which will not influence the decoding
of the intended signal. Furthermore, [19] directly exploited the
inter-user interference as the jamming signal to ensure security.
In the above traditional approaches, the jamming signal or
the interfering signal is always cancelled or suppressed at
the intended receiver. Recently, a refreshing interference ex-
ploitation (IE) technique, which is also known as constructive
interference (CI) in the literature [21] and realized through
symbol-level precoding (SLP) based on the instantaneous data
2symbol knowledge as well as the CSI [20], has overturned the
traditional viewpoint on the interference in a multiuser trans-
mission. It suggests that the interference power can further
contribute to the received useful signal power and benefit the
detection at the receiver with suitable precoding. Based on
this viewpoint, IE-based SLP strategies have been studied for
various constellations [22]–[27]. For instance, in [22], [23], the
authors introduced the concept of the constructive region and
investigated the non-strict phase rotation constraints for phase
shift keying (PSK) modulated signals in a multiuser MISO
(MU-MISO) downlink channel to achieve better detection
performance. In [24]–[26], the authors further extended CI
to generic multilevel modulations, i.e, quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM), in MISO and multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) interference channels. [27] studied a spatio-
temporal faster-than-Nyquist SLP method with amplitude PSK
modulations in downlink multiuser MISO channels. Besides,
some related works also introduced efficient algorithms to
solve the SLP problems [28]–[30]. In [28], the authors derived
a closed-form solution for the signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio (SINR) maximization problem for CI precoding in the
multiuser downlink network, and showed that the CI scheme
performs much better than the zero-forcing (ZF) scheme; in
[29], a convex optimization for SLP was presented for the sum
power minimization problem in a multiuser MIMO system,
and a low-latency algorithm was proposed to find a heuristic
solution to the optimization problem; in [30], a simplified
reformulation of the power minimization problem was derived
in the multiuser MISO unicast channel, where a closed-form
suboptimal SLP solution was obtained using Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions.
Inspired by the above SLP works, the concept of IE/CI
has also been extended to the field of physical layer security,
where the jamming signal is designed to be constructive to the
legitimate users while destructive to the eavesdropper in [31]–
[33]. For example, in [31], a designed jamming scheme (DJS)
was proposed for the multi-eavesdropper network, where the
jamming signal is obtained by minimizing the transmit power
of the source under the cases with full, statistical, and no
knowledge of the wiretap channels based on SLP. It is shown
that the DJS scheme yields superior performance over conven-
tional AN schemes. In [32], the authors employed the concept
of the directional modulation, and proposed a non-jamming
scheme (NJS) to enhance the security of multi-receivers in
MIMO wiretap network in the presence of one eavesdropper.
In addition, the joint physical layer security and SLP scheme
has also been extended to the energy harvesting scheme in
[33], where the authors demonstrated that the CI scheme yields
huge power savings over traditional non-SLP schemes.
Although CI strategy was considered in the above existing
works to improve the power efficiency and security perfor-
mance, there exist some issues to be further addressed in terms
of security. Note that in [31], the proposed IE approach only
exploits part of the ‘complete destructive region’ of the re-
ceived signals at Eve, and therefore the resulting performance
in [31] is sub-optimal, which will be further elaborated math-
ematically in the following. Besides, the optimization problem
in [31] only considered the effect of the precoders on the
power, while ignored the effect of the bound on the destructive
region, and the analysis on the SINR-balancing problem was
also missing. Moreover, the security of the above existing SLP
schemes is realized based on the assumption that the eaves-
dropper decodes the signal with minimum mean-squared error
(MMSE) estimation, zero-forcing (ZF), or directly decodes the
symbol as the legitimate user, which is known as a common
eavesdropper [32]. When the eavesdropper is smart enough
to utilize the maximum likelihood (ML) approach to intercept
signal with known precoding strategy at the transmitter and
the global CSI, the security of the schemes in [31] and [32]
cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, in order to address the above
remaining issues, we aim to guarantee the security of a K-user
MISO wiretap channel based on IE precoding in the presence
of a general eavesdropper, which can be either a common one
or a smart one. For clarity, the contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
• Compared to [31] and [32], for the scenario with a
common eavesdropper, we re-design the CI condition
for physical layer security by further including two sub-
destructive regions for the case with full Eve’s CSI.
The corresponding power minimization problem is re-
formulated by taking into account the derived ‘complete
destructive region’ and the effect of the wiretap SINR,
which are jointly optimized.
• In addition to the power minimization problem, we fur-
ther study the SINR balancing problem with full, statisti-
cal, and no Eve’s CSI at the transmitter, respectively. Both
the SINR thresholds for the legitimate receivers and the
eavesdropper are optimized in the formulated problems
to achieve a better secrecy performance.
• For the network with a smart eavesdropper that performs
the ML detection, we propose a random jamming scheme
(RJS) and a random precoding scheme (RPS), where the
jamming signal and the interfering signals are designed
based on ZF and strict-CI conditions, respectively.
• To solve the introduced convex/non-convex problems in
an efficient manner, we present an iterative algorithm
to solve the convex SLP problems based on the KKT
conditions and penalty function, where a closed-form
solution is obtained within each iteration. For the non-
convex optimization problems resulting from statistical
or no Eves’ CSI, we utilize the Taylor expansion to deal
with the non-convex constraints. The complexity of each
optimization problem is also analyzed.
Simulation results validate the superiority of the proposed
schemes on the security performance and the computation
efficiency of the proposed algorithm. More specifically, it is
shown that when the precoders and the threshold of SINR at
Eve are jointly optimized in the ‘complete destructive region’,
the transmit power at the transmitter can be further reduced.
For the network with a smart eavesdropper, the proposed RJS
and RPS significantly improve the secrecy performance com-
pared with the DJS [31] and the NJS in [32]. It is also observed
that the proposed iterative algorithm outperforms CVX-based
solutions markedly in terms of computation efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
3tion II, we introduce the MISO wiretap model and the jamming
scheme. In Section III, we analyze the interference exploitation
scheme for the system with a common eavesdropper, and in
Section IV, we propose two random schemes for the network
with a smart eavesdropper. Section V proposes an efficient
algorithm for both the convex SLP problems in Section III
and the non-convex SLP problems in Section IV. Simulation
results are presented in Section VI and Section VII concludes
the paper.
Notations: Throughout the paper, lowercase letters denote
the scalars and bold lowercase letters represent the vectors.
Matrices are denoted by bold uppercase letters. C and R de-
note the complex and real numbers, respectively. The operators
(·)T , (·)H , (·)∗, (·)† represent the transpose, conjugate trans-
position, conjugate, and pseudo inverse operation, respectively.
| · | denote the absolute value of a real number or the modulus
of a complex number, and ‖·‖F represents the Frobenius norm.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will first describe the system model, and
then introduce the traditional physical layer security scheme
based on CI.
A. System Model
Consider a K-user MISO wiretap channel, the source
(Alice) with N antennas transmits confidential symbols to
K single-antenna users, where the data symbol sk is drawn
from a unit-norm M -PSK constellation for user k (Uk, k ∈
{1, 2, ...,K}), i.e., sk = ejφk . There also exists a single-
antenna external eavesdropper (Eve), which is near one of the
users, e.g., Um, and attempts to wiretap the corresponding
information symbol sm. To protect the confidential symbol, a
jamming symbol v = |v|ejφv ∼ CN (0, 1) is inserted to the
transmitted signal which is
x =
K∑
i=1
wisi + p
v
|v| , (1)
where wi ∈ CN and p ∈ CN represent the precoding vectors
for si and v, respectively. In this way, the received signals at
Uk and Eve are respectively given by
yk = h
T
k x+ nk, (2)
ye = g
T
e x+ ne, (3)
where hk ∼ CN (0, IN ) ∈ CN and ge ∼ CN (0, IN ) ∈ CN
represent the complex Gaussian channel vectors between Alice
and {Uk, Eve}, respectively. Here, Alice is assumed to know
the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel
hHk , as in [31]–[33]. nk ∼ CN (0, σ2k) and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e)
are the additive Gaussian noise at Uk and Eve, respectively.
B. Review of CI in Physical Layer Security
In this section, we briefly review the existing CI approach
for physical layer security in [31] and explain why it is sub-
optimal. Compared to traditional methods, CI-based schemes
find various benefits when applied to physical layer security.
Fig. 1: Constructive Zone for Bob.
On one hand, by judiciously designing the precoding strategy
with CI, all interfering signals including the jamming signal
can be made constructive to the information symbol, which
improves the decodability of the intended symbol at the
legitimate receiver. On the other hand, when the transmitter
knows the full Eve’s CSI, CI-based scheme can push the
wiretapped signal to the destructive region of the information
symbol to further degrade the performance of the Eve. In
what follows, we present the corresponding mathematical CI
conditions.
To be specific, firstly we rewrite the received signal yk as
yk = h
T
k
(
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φk) + pej(φv−φk)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λk
sk + nk. (4)
For legitimate transmission, CI-based schemes exploit the
available knowledge of CSI as well as the intended sym-
bols and jamming symbols to design the precoders, which
enables the received signal at Uk to lie in the constructive
region of the corresponding desired symbol sk, as depicted
in Fig. 1, where sk is assumed in the first quadrant. tk is
also treated as the distance between the constructive region
and the detection thresholds. Intuitively, when the received
signal is located farther away from the information symbol
within the constellation boundary, i.e., in the constructive zone,
the detection thresholds are increased, which improves the
detection performance. Based on the geometry in Fig. 1, to
achieve CI, the following condition should be satisfied at Uk
[22]:
|Im(λk)|
Re(λk)− tk ≤ tan θ, (5)
where θ = pi
M
, and |Im(λk)| and Re(λk) essentially rotate
the observation of the desired symbol onto the axis of the
constellation symbol under consideration. Instead of being
cancelled as in ZF, the jamming and interfering signals are
both utilized in CI-based schemes to push the received signals
farther away from the detection thresholds.φ
For the wiretap transmission, we consider the case with
full Eve’s CSI, which is valid for the scenarios that Eve is
still an active user but performs other services or has low
priority compared with the legitimate users on some services
in the network [31]. For example, consider a video-on-demand
service in a cellular network, the users who pay for this service
form a group, and the others form another group. When the
4Fig. 2: Destructive Zone at Eve.
base station broadcasts the purchasable videos, it needs to
send signals with better quality to the paid users, but avoid
leaking out or just send noisy signals to the non-paid ones.
If these non-paid users attempt to enjoy the service without
purchase, they become the potential eavesdroppers. In this
group authentication scenario, the transmitter knows the CSI
of all users from the mutual communication, including the
potential eavesdroppers’ CSI, and the security problem under
the case with full Eve’s CSI is essential to be discussed.
Therefore, when Eve attempts to wiretap the information
symbol sm, m ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} in the case with full Eve’s
CSI, the received signal ye in (3) is rewritten as
ye = g
T
e
(
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φm) + pej(φv−φm)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
φe
sm + ne. (6)
To avoid the interception by the eavesdropper, [31] proposed
the concept of ‘destructive region’ for the case with full
Eve’s CSI, which is an opposite concept compared to the
constructive region and aims to further distort the received
signal for Eve. Geometrically, it aims to locate the wiretapped
signal in the destructive regions A and B such that only
incorrect data symbol can be decoded by the Eve, as shown in
Fig. 2, i.e., the pink regions located in the right side of line lb,
which are symmetric to line la. Accordingly, the mathematical
IE condition for Eve can be
Re(φe)− te ≥ 0, (7)
|Im(φe)| ≥ tan θ[Re(φe)− te]. (8)
where te is defined as the distance between the destructive
zone and the detection thresholds at Eve. Based on the above
analysis, it is apparent that [31] does not exploit the complete
destructive region and only leads to sub-optimal solutions,
since the left-hand area of lb is not considered. Mathematically,
this is due to the fact that [31] does not consider the case when
the term [Re(φe)− te] becomes negative.
III. INTERFERENCE EXPLOITATION SCHEME WITH A
COMMON EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we focus on the IE schemes for the case
with a common eavesdropper, i.e., the eavesdropper decodes
the information signal intuitively without any operation as
the legitimate users, where N − K ≥ 1. We first introduce
Fig. 3: Complete Destructive zone at Eve.
the ‘complete destructive region’ along with the correspond-
ing mathematical CI conditions, based on which a power-
minimization problem is proposed to optimize the precodersw
and p subject to the sum transmit power constraint (5) and the
CI constraints (7)-(8) with the given tk and te. The IE-based
SINR balancing problem under the cases with full, statistical,
and non Eves’ CSI respectively is also studied to improve the
security of the information signals at the users.
A. Improved Power Minimization Problem
Compared to [31] which only considers part of the destruc-
tive regions for Eve, we expand the destructive regions shown
in Fig. 2 to the ‘complete destructive regions’ in the case with
full Eve’s CSI, which is shown in Fig. 3. Note that in addition
to the subregions A and B, the blue regions C and D located in
the left side of line lb that are symmetric to line la also denote
the destructive regions, where the IE conditions for subregions
C and D are given by
Re(φe)− te ≤ 0. (9)
The reason for the existence of the subregions C and D lies
in the case that when the angle between the random jamming
symbol and te occasionally becomes more than
pi
2 , the sum
received signal will lie in C or D. To this end, all subregions A-
D formulate the ‘complete destructive region’ for the intended
symbol at Eve.
Based on the above derived complete destructive region,
the power minimization problem can be constructed by jointly
optimizing the SINR threshold at Eve te and the precoders to
pursue a lower power consumption at the source, given by:
P1 : min
wi,p,te
∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
s.t. hTk
[
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φk) + pej(φv−φk)
]
sk = λksk,
∀k, (10a)
|Im(λk)| ≤ tan θ (Re(λk)− tk) , ∀k, (10b)
gTe
(
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φm) + pej(φv−φm)
)
sm = φesm,
m ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, (10c)
X , (10d)
te ≥ 0, (10e)
5TABLE I: The set X in P1
Subregions X
A Re(φe)− te ≥ 0, Im(φe) ≥ tan θ(Re(φe)− te)
B Re(φe)− te ≥ 0, Im(φe) ≤ − tan θ(Re(φe)− te)
C&D Re(φe)− te ≤ 0
where (10a)-(10b) denote the constructive region conditions
at Uk; (10c)-(10d) denote the destructive region conditions
for Eves, where X is the geometric conditions for subregions
A-D, which are summarized in Table I for clarity. Note that
since these four conditions are contradicting to each other,
Alice should calculate the above optimization problem under
each sub-destruction zone separately, and choose the best one,
i.e., the minimum transmit power, as the final result. Overall,
this optimization problem considers the effect of both the
precoders and the distance between the detection threshold
and destructive region on the transmit power, which is more
general than the existing works in [31]- [32] and leads to
further transmit power savings.
Note that the optimization problem P1 is a convex problem,
and it can be readily solved by mathematical tools such as
CVX. To make the proposed schemes more applicable to
the practical scenarios, we will further derive a closed-form
solution for the above problem with low complexity in Section
V.
B. SINR Balancing Problem
In addition to the power minimization problem, we also
consider the SINR balancing problem for the cases with full,
statistical, and no Eve’s CSI, respectively with the derived
‘complete destructive region’, where both the SINR constraints
at the users and the Eve have been jointly considered in the
optimization problems with the precoders.
1) Full Eve’s CSI: Consider a case with full CSI of
Eve’s channel at the transmitter, we attempt to maximize the
minimal achievable SINR t = min{t1, · · · , tK} for all the
legitimate users under the given transmit power budget, while
constraining the received signal for Eve to be located in the
destructive regions, which is constructed as
P2 : min
wi,p,te,t
−t
s.t. hTk
[
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φk) + pej(φv−φk)
]
sk = λksk,
∀k, (11a)
|Im(λk)| ≤ tan θ (Re(λk)− t) , ∀k, (11b)
gTe
(
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φm) + pej(φv−φm)
)
sm = φesm,
m ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, (11c)
X , (11d)∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
≤ Ps, (11e)
t ≥ 0, (11f)
te ≥ 0, (11g)
where (11e) represents the sum transmit power constraint, and
Ps is the maximum available transmit power at the transmitter.
2) Statistical Eves’ CSI: When Alice can only obtain the
statistical CSI of the wiretap channels by a long time obser-
vation instead of the instantaneous CSI, the wiretap ability
of the Eve should be constrained with these average values.
Let Re = E{gegHe } be the correlation matrix of the wiretap
channel ge, which is assumed to be a nonsingular positive
definite matrix. Then, the SINR at Eve can be expressed as
Γe =
wHmRewm
K∑
i=1,i6=m
wHi Rewi + p
HRep+ σ2e
. (12)
Applying (12), we can construct the statistical SINR balancing
problems as
P3 : min
wi,p,t,te
−t
s.t. hTk
[
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φk) + pej(φv−φk)
]
sk = λksk,
∀k, (13a)
|Im(λk)| ≤ tan θ (Re(λk)− t) , ∀k, (13b)
Γe ≤ te, (13c)∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
≤ Ps, (13d)
t ≥ 0, (13e)
te ≥ 0. (13f)
where the signal received at Uk is still located in the construc-
tive region of the information symbol, while for the wiretapped
signal at Eve, the wiretapped SINR is constrained to be lower
than te. Note that the constraint condition (13c) denotes a
non-convex set, and we will deal with it based on the Taylor
expansion in Section V.
3) No Eves’ CSI: From the above two cases with full Eves’
CSI and statistical Eves’ CSI, we notice that the wiretap ability
of the Eve has been constrained by either the destructive region
or the SINR threshold. Consider a worse case with no Eves’
CSI, Alice is unable to precode the intercepted signal at Eve,
and thus the CI conditions are only utilized for the useful
symbols at users, i.e., we have
P4 : max
wi,p,t
t
s.t. hTk
[
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φk) + pej(φv−φk)
]
sk = λksk,
∀k, (14a)
|Im(λk)| ≤ tan θ (Re(λk)− t) , ∀k, (14b)∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
≤ Ps, (14c)
‖p‖2F ≥ P0, (14d)
t ≥ 0, (14e)
where P0 is the threshold for the jamming power, and can
be chosen based on the target symbol-error-rate (SER) at
6Eve numerically. Note that (14d) is a non-convex constraint,
and we will reformulate it into a linear constraint by Taylor
expansion in Section V.
IV. INTERFERENCE EXPLOITATION SCHEME WITH A
SMART EAVESDROPPER
Apart from the optimization problems in the above section
which are formulated for a common eavesdropper, the eaves-
dropper can also be a smart one that imitates the transmission
scheme at the source, which has been considered in [32]. If the
eavesdropper knows the modulation type and the transmission
strategy at the source, it can virtually put itself in the location
of the transmitter, go throughMK groups of transmit symbols
with the known CSI knowledge, and follow the maximum
likelihood approach to find the optimal precoders. In this
case, even though the eavesdropper does not know the exact
jamming signal, it can still produce the equivalent precoders
for the system to realize CI conditions, and the transmission
scheme becomes unsafe. To address this issue when a smart
eavesdropper is present, in this section we propose two random
schemes to ensure security of the network, where we consider
the worst case that Alice has no knowledge of the wiretap
channel.
A. Random Jamming Scheme (RJS)
For jamming schemes in the previous section, the random-
ness is the key factor that confuses the eavesdropper to ensure
security. Thus, a natural idea is that the jamming signal pejφv
in the transmitted signal should not be treated as the construc-
tive interfering signals, but instead be treated as the noise for
all receivers. In this way, the precoder p should be designed in
the null space of the legitimate channels so that the receivers
would not be interfered. Define H = [h1,h2, · · · ,hK ]T ∈
CK×N , the null space condition is denoted as Hp = 0. Note
that when N −K ≥ 1, rank(H) = K holds, and the singular
value decomposition (SVD) of H is given by H = U0ΣV0,
where the columns of U0 are the left singular vectors of H,
Σ is the singular values diagonal matrix, and the columns of
V0 are the right singular vectors of H. Denote the last N−K
columns of V0 ∈ CN×N as a matrix V1 ∈ CN×(N−K), the
general solution of Hp = 0 can be expressed as p = V1k‖V1k‖F
,
where k ∈ RN−K is a random vector. Hence, we rewrite the
transmitted signal x as
x =
K∑
i=1
wisi +
√
Pnp
v
|v| , (15)
where Pn represents the allocated power for the jamming sig-
nal. Accordingly, the SINR balancing problem that optimizes
the precoding vectors and the SNR threshold for legitimate
users can be formulated as
P5 : max
wi,t
t
s.t. hTk
K∑
i=1
wie
j(φi−φk)sk = τksk, ∀k, (16a)
|Im(τk)| ≤ tan θ [Re(τk)− t] , ∀k, (16b)∥∥∥∥∥
K∑
i=1
wisi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
F
≤ Ps − Pn, (16c)
t ≥ 0. (16d)
In this way, the received signals at Uk and Eve are respectively
given by
yk = τksk + nk, (17)
ye = g
T
e
K∑
i=1
wisi +
√
Png
T
e pe
jφv + ne. (18)
From (16)-(18), we can indicate that in the proposed random
jamming scheme, CI is only exploited for the legitimate
users, while the randomness of the jamming signal has been
preserved at Eve for security. Besides, by controlling the
value of Pn, there exists a tradeoff between the detection
performance and the security performance of the legitimate
users.
B. Random Precoding Scheme (RPS)
Note that in security-critical scenarios, the system will
need a high jamming power to ensure security with the
aforementioned random jamming scheme, which reduces the
power allocated to the information signal and leads to inferior
performance for legitimate users. In order to improve the de-
codability of the information signal at the legitimate receivers,
we propose a random precoding scheme, which utilizes a
random precoding vector based on the alignment condition
in [28] to ensure security.
To be specific, the transmitted signal is redesigned as
x =
K∑
i=1
wisi +
√
Pnp. (19)
Let s = [s1, s2, ...sK ]
T ∈ CK , p is designed by the following
two steps:
• First, we construct an intermediate variable pˆ, which
satisfies the condition Hpˆ = s;
• Then, p is obtained by normalizing the vector pˆ, i.e.,
p = pˆ‖pˆ‖ .
When N −K ≥ 1, the condition rank(H) = K < N holds.
Similar as that in RJS scheme, pˆ can be denoted as pˆ =
V1k + r0, where r0 is the specific solution to the equation
Hpˆ = s that can be achieved as r0 = H
†s. It indicates that
there are infinite solutions for pˆ due to the random k, thus, pˆ
can be randomly chosen among these infinite solutions. Then,
7with the designed wi from P5, the received signal at Uk and
Eve are respectively given by
yk = τksk +
√
Pnh
T
k p+ nk
=
(
τk +
√
Pn
‖pˆ‖
)
sk + nk, (20)
ye = g
T
e
K∑
i=1
wisi +
√
Png
T
e p+ ne. (21)
Different from the random jamming scheme and the traditional
precoding scheme, the proposed random precoding scheme
aligns the received signal of Uk to the same direction of the
intended symbol, and meanwhile inserts the randomness to
the wiretapped signal at Eve without causing power loss at
the legitimate users, which improves the power efficiency at
the source.
To summarize, when the eavesdropper decodes the signal
directly, the proposed precoding designs based on P1-P4 can
protect the information signals; when the eavesdropper is smart
enough to perform ML detection, the proposed RJS and RPS
are more suitable to ensure security. In practical systems, when
the decoding strategy of the eavesdropper is unpredictable at
the transmitter, the proposed random schemes can be regarded
as more practical and general approaches for the case with
no knowledge of the eavesdropper. In the following, we will
provide an efficient algorithm to solve the above optimization
problems P1 − P5.
V. EFFICIENT ALGORITHMS
In this section, we propose an efficient iterative algorithm
for the convex optimization problems P1, P2, and P5, where
the closed-form solutions of the precoders are achieved in each
iteration. For the non-convex problems P3-P4, we resort to
Taylor expansion, which transforms them into convex ones.
A. Efficient Algorithm for P1, P2, and P5
Recalling that the problems P1-P2 and P5 are all convex,
we will explore the solution of the most complicated problem
P2 in subregion A as an example. By following a similar
procedure, the proposed algorithm can also be applied to P1
and P5 as well.
In P2, we first rewrite the power constraint (11e) as [28]
K∑
i=1
wHi wi + p
Hp ≤ Ps
K + 1
. (22)
Applying (22), we then analyze P2 by Lagrangian and KKT
conditions, where the Lagrangian function is given by
L1(wi,p, t, te, δ0, δ1, δ2,k, δ3,k, δ4, κ1, κ2, κ3)
=− t+
K∑
k=1
δ2,k
[
hTk
(
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
)
− λksk
]
+
K∑
k=1
δ3,k{|Im(λk)| − tan θ[Re(λk)− t]}
+ δ4
(
K∑
i=1
wHi wi + p
Hp− Ps
K + 1
)
+ κ1
[
gTe
(
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
)
− φesm
]
+ κ2[te − Re(φe)]
+ κ3{tan θ[Re(φe)− te]− Im(φe)} − δ0te − δ1t, (23)
where δ0, δ1, δ3,k, δ4, κ2, κ3 denote the non-negative La-
grangian coefficients. Based on the Lagrangian function, the
KKT conditions for the optimality of P2 are given by
∂L1
∂wi
=
K∑
k=1
δ2,kh
T
k si + 2δ4w
H
i + κ1g
T
e si = 0, (24a)
∂L1
∂p
=
K∑
k=1
δ2,kh
T
k e
jφv + 2δ4p
H + κ1g
T
e e
jφv = 0, (24b)
∂L1
∂te
= −δ0 + κ2 − κ3 tan θ = 0 (24c)
∂L1
∂t
= −1− δ1 +
K∑
i=1
δ3,k tan θ = 0, (24d)
δ2,k
[
hk
(
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
)
− λksk
]
= 0, ∀k, (24e)
δ3,k{|Im(λk)| − tan θ[Re(λk)− t]} = 0, ∀k, (24f)
δ4
(
K∑
i=1
wHi wi + p
Hp− Ps
K + 1
)
= 0, (24g)
κ1
[
ge
(
K∑
i=1
wisi + pe
jφv
)
− φesm
]
= 0, (24h)
κ2[te − Re(φe)] = 0, (24i)
κ3[tan θ(Re(φe)− te)− Im(φe)], (24j)
− δ0te = 0, (24k)
− δ1t = 0. (24l)
From (24a) and (24b), we can obtain the optimal precoding
vectors as
wHi = −
1
2δ4
(
K∑
k=1
δ2,kh
T
k + κ1g
T
e
)
si
= (δˆH+ κˆgTe )si, (25)
pH = (δˆH+ κˆgTe )e
jφv , (26)
where δ2,k and κ1 are complex variables, and
δˆ = [− δ2,12δ4 ,−
δ2,2
2δ4
, ...,− δ2,K2δ4 ], κˆ = − κ22δ4 . Let
b = [s1, s2, ..., sK , e
jφv ]T , we further obtain
W = [w1,w2, ...,wK ,p] = [H
H δˆH + g∗e κˆ
H ]bH . (27)
Besides, (11a) and (11c) can be respectively rewritten in matrix
forms as
HWb = diag{λ}s, (28)
gTeWb = φesm. (29)
8where λ = [λ1, λ2, ..., λK ]
T . Inserting (27) into (28) and (29),
the constraint coefficients δˆH and κˆ∗ can be derived as
δˆH = (HHH)−1
(
1
K + 1
diag{λ}s−Hg∗e κˆ
)
, (30)
κˆ∗ =
1
(K + 1)a
[φesm − gTe HH(HHH)−1diag{λ}s], (31)
where a = gTe [IN −HH(HHH)−1H]g∗e . With (30) and (31),
W in (27) can be expressed as a function of the variables
diag{λ} and φe in a closed form, i.e.,
W =
1
K + 1
(Adiag{λ}s+Cφesm)bH , (32)
where
A =
{
IN − 1
a
[IN −HH(HHH)−1H]g∗egTe
}
HH(HHH)−1,
(33)
C =
1
a
[IN −HH(HHH)−1H]g∗e . (34)
Due to that δ4 6= 0, the power constraint (11e) can be deduced
as
‖Wb‖2F ≤ Ps ⇒ bHWHWb ≤ Ps
⇒ λH diag{sH}AHAdiag{s}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
λ+ λH diag{sH}AHCsm︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
φe
+ φ∗e s
∗
mC
HAdiag{s}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
λ+ φ∗e s
∗
mC
HCsm︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
φe ≤ Ps
⇒ λHT1λ+ λHT2φe + φeHT3λ+ φeHT4φe ≤ Ps,
(35)
Since λ and φ are both complex, we expand
them into their real equivalence as λˆ =
[Re(λ), Im(λ)]T , Φˆ = [Re(φe), Im(Φe)]
T , and
Tˆi = [Re(Ti),−Im(Ti); Im(Ti),Re(Ti)], i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Accordingly, (35) can be rewritten as
λˆHTˆ1λˆ+ λˆ
HTˆ2Φˆ+ Φˆ
HTˆ3λˆ+ Φˆ
HTˆ4Φˆ ≤ Ps. (36)
Thus, P6 with subregion A can be transformed into
P6 : min
λˆ,Φˆ,te,t
−t
s.t. (36),
Im(λk)
tan θ
≤ Re(λk)− t, ∀k, (37a)
− Im(λk)
tan θ
≤ Re(λk)− t, ∀k, (37b)
te − Re(φk) ≤ 0, (37c)
− Im(φk)
tan θ
≤ te − Re(φk), (37d)
t ≥ 0, (37e)
te ≥ 0. (37f)
For simplicity, we define
Tˆ5 =
[ −IK 1tan θ IK−IK − 1tan θ IK
]
, Tˆ6 =
[ −1 0
1 − 1tan θ
]
,
F1 =
[
Tˆ1 Tˆ2
Tˆ3 Tˆ4
]
, F2 = [Tˆ5,02K×2], F3 = [02×2K , Tˆ6],
γ = [λˆT , ΦˆT ]T , 1 = [1, ..., 1]T ∈ R2K , 10 = [−1, 1]T ,
then, P6 becomes
P7 : min
γ,te,t
te
s.t. γTF1γ − Ps ≤ 0, (38a)
F2γ + t1 ≤ 02K , (38b)
F3γ − te10 ≤ 02 (38c)
t ≥ 0, (38d)
te ≥ 0. (38e)
In P7, the precoding vectors wi and p to be degraded to a
single vector γ, and the IE constraints are reformulated into
the compact form in (38b)-(38c). To proceed, we write the
Lagrangian function P7 as
L2(γ, te, t, δ0, δ1, µ0,µ1,µ2)
=− t− δ0te − δ1t+ µ0(γTF1γ − Ps) + µT1 (F2γ + t1)
+ µT2 (F3γ − te10), (39)
where µ0 ≥ 0, µi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. We derive the KKT
conditions for L2 as
∂L2
∂γ
= 2µ0F1γ + F
T
2 µ1 + F
T
3 µ2 = 0, (40a)
∂L2
∂te
= −δ0 − µT2 10 = 0 (40b)
∂L2
∂t
= −1− δ1 + µT1 1 = 0, (40c)
µ0(γ
TF1γ − Ps) = 0, (40d)
µT1 (F2γ + t1) = 0, (40e)
µT2 (F3γ − te10) = 0, (40f)
− δ0te = 0, (40g)
− δ1t = 0, (40h)
where (40a) follows that FT1 = F1. By introducing F =
[FT2 ,F
T
3 ] and µ = [µ
T
1 ,µ
T
2 ]
T , we can deduce the closed-form
expression of γ as
γ = − 1
2µ0
F−11 Fµ. (41)
Inserting (41) into (40d), the dual variable µ0 is derived as
µ0 =
√
µTFTF−11 Fµ
4Ps
. (42)
According to [28], since the optimization problem P7 is
a convex problem, and the Slater’s condition is satisfied,
so that the strong duality holds. Thus, we will analyze its
corresponding dual problem with (40)-(41), which can be
transformed by
G = max
µ,δ0,δ1,µ0
min
γ,te,t
L2
= max
µ
−
√
PsµTFTF
−1
1 Fµ. (43)
9TABLE II: Complexity Analysis of the Proposed Problems
Algorithms Order n Complexity
P1 O((K + 1)N + 1) A&B: ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 3n[n2 + n(3 + 2K) + 3 + 2K]
C&D: ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 2n[n2 + n(2 + 2K) + 2 + 2K]
P2 O((K + 1)N + 2) A&B: ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 6n[n2 + n(4 + 2K) + (N2(K + 1)2 + 2K + 4)]
C&D: ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 5n[n2 + n(3 + 2K) + (N2(K + 1)2 + 2K + 3)]
P3 O((K + 1)N + 2) ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 6n[n2 + n(2K + 2) + (2K + 2 +N2(K + 1)2 + (N + 1)2)]
P4 O((K + 1)N + 1) ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 4n[n2 + n(2K + 2) + (2K + 2 +N2(K + 1)2)]
P5 O(KN + 1) ln(1/ǫ)
√
2K + 3n[n2 + n(2K + 1) + 2K + 1 +K2N2]
Algorithm 1 The iterative optimization algorithm for P9
1: Set initial values µn ≥ 0 and η, where η is an extremely
large positive value.
2: Calculate (ξn1 , ξ
n
2 ) with µ
n by using (48);
3: Calculate µn+1 with (ξn1 , ξ
n
2 ) by using (50) and (51);
4: while |µn+1 − µn| > ǫ do
5: Update n = n+ 1, and let µn = µn+1;
6: Repeat steps 2 and 3;
7: end while
8: Return the optimal µ = µn, (ξ1, ξ2) = (ξ
n
1 , ξ
n
2 ).
Let Q = FTF−11 F, f1 = [0
T
2K ,1
T
0 ]
T , and f2 = [1
T ,0T2 ]
T , the
dual problem can be constructed with G as
P8 : min
µ
µTQµ
s.t. − µT f1 ≥ 0, (44a)
µT f2 − 1 ≥ 0. (44b)
To improve the calculation efficiency of the optimization prob-
lem, we propose an iterative algorithm with penalty method by
reformulating P8 into a non-constrained problem. To be spe-
cific, we first transform (44a)-(44b) into equality constraints
by introducing auxiliary variables ξ1 and ξ2, respectively, i.e.,
− µT f1 = ξ1 ≥ 0, (45a)
µT f2 − 1 = ξ2 ≥ 0. (45b)
Following the principle of the penalty method, P8 can be
transformed into the following unconstrained problem:
P9 : min
µ,ξ1,ξ2
µTQµ+ η[(−µT f1 − ξ1)2 + (µT f2 − 1− ξ2)2],
(46)
where η is the penalty factor. To solve P9, we propose an
iterative method by alternating optimizing the variables µ and
(ξ1, ξ2) as follows:
• First, we optimize µ by setting (ξ1, ξ2) fixed, where
the objective function (46) is denoted as f(µ). Since
the objective function of P9 is in a quadratic form, the
derivative of f1(µ) with respect to µ can be expressed
as
df1(µ)
dµ
=2Qµ+ 2η[(f1f
T
1 + f2f
T
2 )µ
+ ξ1f1 − (1 + ξ2)f2]. (47)
Let
df1(µ)
dµ
= 0, the closed-form of µ is expressed as
µ = η[Q+η(f1f
T
1 + f2f
T
2 )]
−1[−ξ1f1+(1+ξ2)f2]. (48)
• Second, we optimize (ξ1, ξ2) by setting µ fixed, where
the objective function (45) is reduced as
f2(ξ1, ξ2) = (µ
T f1 + ξ1)
2 + (µT f2 − 1− ξ2)2. (49)
Calculating the partial derivative of f2(ξ1, ξ2) with re-
spect to ξ1 and ξ2, respectively, we can obtain the optimal
value of (ξ1, ξ2) as
ξ1 = −µT f1, (50)
ξ2 = µ
T f2 − 1. (51)
Finally, we summarize the iterative algorithm in Algorithm
1. It indicates that in each iteration, a closed-form solution of
µ is achieved. Then, by inserting µ into (41) and combining
(32), the optimal precoding matrix can be obtained in a closed
form as
W =− 1
2µ0(K + 1)
(Adiag{U1F−11 Fµ}s
+ u2F
−1
1 FµCsm)b
H , (52)
where U1 = [IK jIK 0K×2] ∈ RK×2(K+1) and u2 =
[01×2K 1 j] ∈ R1×2(K+1) are used to transform the real-
valued parameters λ and φe into their complex expressions.
B. Linearization Algorithm for P3 and P4
Due to the non-convexity of the constraints (15)-(16) in
P3 and P4, it is hard to solve the corresponding optimization
problem directly. Besides, different from the existing algorithm
in [31], te becomes a variable to be optimized in our proposed
scheme. Thus, we propose to utilize the Taylor expansion to
linearize the non-convex constraints into convex ones.
Define tz =
1
te
, the constraint (15) becomes
wHmRewm ≤
1
tz
(
K∑
i=1,i6=m
wHi Rewi + p
HRep+ σ
2
e). (53)
We observe that both the left-hand side and the right-hand
side of (53) are convex, while the right-hand side is in the
form of quadratic-over-linear. Thus, we attempt to linearize
the right-hand side with the first-order Taylor expansion, which
efficiently transforms the constraint (13) into a convex one. To
be specific, we introduce the slack variables t˜z , w˜i, p˜, and t˜,
and perform the first-order Taylor expansion of the functions
fU(x, y) =
xHUx
y
and f(y) = 1/y at the point (x˜, y˜) and
y = y˜ respectively, where
FU(x, y, x˜, y˜) = 2Re(x˜
HUx)
y˜
− x˜
HUx˜
y˜2
y, (54)
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F(y, y˜) = 1
y˜
− y − y˜
y˜2
. (55)
To this end, (53) can be approximated as
wHmRewm ≤
K∑
i=1,i6=m
FRe(wi, tz , w˜i, t˜z)
+ FRe(p, tz , p˜, t˜z) + σ2eF(tz, t˜z). (56)
Then, using (56), the optimization problem P3 becomes a
convex optimization problem, and can be effectively solved
by CVX tool.
Similarly, for P4, the non-convex constraint (14) is also
transformed as
P0 ≤ F(p, p˜), (57)
where F(x, x˜) = 2Re(x˜Hx) − x˜H x˜ denotes the Taylor
conversion of f(x) = xHx at the point x = x˜. Hence, P5
can be solved with (57) numerically using CVX tool.
C. Computational Complexity
Finally, we evaluate the complexity of the proposed al-
gorithms of different types based on [34]. For clarity, we
summarize the computational complexity results in Table II
, where n denotes the number of the decision variables. The
detailed analysis is shown as follows:
• In P1, the number of the decision variables is on the order
of (K +1)N +1. It has 3+ 2K linear matrix inequality
(LMI) constraints of size one in subregions A&B, 2+2K
LMI constraints of size one in subregions C&D.
• In P2, the number of the decision variables is on the order
of (K + 1)N + 2 and one SOC constraint of dimension
(K + 1)N . When the wiretapped signal is located in the
subregions A&B, it has 4 + 2K LMI constraints of size
one; otherwise, it has 3 + 2K LMI constraints of size
one.
• Using (56) to replace (13) in P3, the number of the
decision variables is on the order of (K+1)N+2. It has
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2K +2 LMI constraints of size one, one SOC constraint
of dimension (K + 1)N , and one SOC constraint of
dimensions N + 1.
• Using (57) to replace (14) in P4, the number of the
decision variables is on the order of (K + 1)N + 1. It
has 2K + 2 LMI constraints of size one and one SOC
constraint of dimension (K + 1)N .
• In P5, the number of the decision variables is on the
order of KN +1. It has 2K +2 LMI constraints of size
one, one SOC constraint of dimension (K + 1)N , and
one SOC constraint of dimension N + 1.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we will provide simulation results for the
proposed algorithms by Monte Carlo simulations. For the
legitimate users, they decode the information symbol directly.
For the common eavesdropper, it decodes the symbol with the
same method as the legitimate users without any operation.
For the smart eavesdropper, it is assumed to adopt the ML
detection, and under this case, we will compare our proposed
random schemes with the DJS in [31] and the NJS in [32].
For simplicity, we use Γk and Γe to denote the received SNR
at user k and Eve, where tk = σk
√
Γk, te = σe
√
Γe [31], and
we set σ2e = σ
2
k = 1, ∀k.
First, we examine the transmit power of the proposed prob-
lem P1 and the DJS scheme in [31] with QPSK modulation
under the case with full Eve’s CSI. As depicted in Figs. 4-
5, the secrecy performance DJS is evaluated with the values
Γe = {−5 dB, 0 dB, 5 dB, 10 dB, 0}, and the SNR at Uk is
assumed as Γk = Γ. Fig. 4 indicates that the proposed power
minimization problem outperforms the DJS scheme in terms of
the average transmit power, especially in the low required SNR
regimes. In Fig. 5, the transmit power gain, which is defined
as the difference between the power obtained from DJS and
the proposed P1, clearly shows the advantage of the proposed
scheme in power efficiency. Besides, we also study a special
case of Γe = 0, which represents that no signal is leaked out
to the Eve. It is observed that the case of Γe = 0 requires more
transmit power than the optimal one, and indicates that such
absolute security is at the expense of more transmit power
compared with the proposed scheme.
Next, we present the SER performance of the problems
P2-P4 along with the increasing maximum transmit SNR,
i.e., Ps/σ
2
k, in Figs. 6-7. Each figure shows that when the
transmitter knows full Eve’s CSI, the SER performance at
the Eve is better than those of the cases with statistical and
no Eve’s CSI since the wiretapped signal is designed in the
destructive regions of the information symbol. However, the
SER at the users is a little worse than those two cases due to
the constricted feasible region. Besides, we also demonstrate
that the proposed Algorithm 1 can achieve almost the same
SER performance as CVX tool. Note that the simulation
is performed on an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU 16 GB RAM
computer with 3.4 GHz, Fig. 8 shows that the Algorithm 1
needs extremely less execution time than using CVX tool,
which only occupies 6% ∼ 8% of the time of CVX, and
improve the efficiency significantly.
Considering the case that the eavesdropper is smart, we first
evaluate the constellation diagrams of the received signals at
user 1 and Eve of the comparable schemes DJS and NJS in Fig.
9 over 1000 channel uses with SNR=15 dB. Obviously, we can
indicate that the smart Eve can decode the information symbol
at high probability by ML detection since it can formulate
the corresponding signal to the information symbol. Moreover,
we also display the constellation diagrams of the proposed
schemes RJS and RPS with SNR=10 dB and ρ = P0/Ps = 0.5
in Fig. 10. It is obviously observed that the received symbols
at U1 locates in the expected constructive zone consisting with
the information symbol, while the wiretapped symbols at Eve
randomly distribute in all regions, so that the security can be
guaranteed.
Moreover, we compare the SER performance of the pro-
12
-10 -5 0 5 10
(c)  Re
-10
-5
0
5
10
Im
-10 -5 0 5 10
(a)  Re
-10
-5
0
5
10
Im
-10 -5 0 5 10
(b)  Re
-10
-5
0
5
10
Im
-10 -5 0 5 10
(d)  Re
-10
-5
0
5
10
Im
U1
Eve
Symbol
Jamming
Fig. 10: Constellation diagrams. (a)RJS: QPSK; (b)RPS:
QPSK; (C)RJS: 8PSK; (b)RPS: 8PSK. N = 6,K = 2.
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Fig. 11: QPSK: SER v.s. transmit SNR in a smart Eve case,
N = 6,K = 2.
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Fig. 12: SER v.s. K users in RJS and RPS, N = 6.
posed RJS and RPS with the DJS and RJS in Fig. 11 along
with the increasing SNR, where the comparable schemes are
operated by SINR balancing problem similarly as our proposed
schemes for fairness, and ρ = 0.5. It shows that DJS and
NJS are hard to ensure the security of the information symbol
when Eve uses ML detection, while our proposed schemes
can protect the information signal successfully. The reason is
that the jamming signal or the precoders in the comparable
schemes are designed based on the CI conditions without
randomness. While for the proposed RJS and RPS, we reserve
the randomness of the jamming signal and the precoder p so
that the wiretapped signal varies randomly in each channel use.
Besides, we observe that RPS outperforms the RJS scheme
at the users, which is due to the fact that the precoder p
achieved by strict CI condition attributes to the decodability
of the legitimate users.
Finally, we explore the SER performance along with the
increasing number of the users under QPSK and 8PSK in Fig.
12, where SNR=15 dB and ρ = 0.5. Obviously, the proposed
RJS and RPS can protect the information symbols even with
plenty of the eavesdroppers on the condition that N ≥ K+1.
In addition, the SER performance becomes worse when the
number of the users increases, and RPS under both QPSK
and 8PSK performs better than RJS due to the improved power
efficiency at the transmitter in RPS.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the physical layer security issues of a K-
user MISO wiretap channel when there exists a common or a
smart eavesdropper with SLP schemes. For the network with a
common eavesdropper, we achieved additional transmit power
savings of the network with full Eve’s CSI by introducing
the ‘complete destructive region’ and jointly optimizing the
threshold of the wiretap SINR. In order to improve the secrecy
performance of the network, we analyzed the SINR-balancing
problems with full, statistical, and no Eve’s CSI, and optimized
the SINR thresholds at both legitimate users and eavesdropper
with the precoders. For the case with a smart eavesdropper
with ML decoding strategy, we proposed the RJS and the RPS
based on SLP strategy to protect the information symbols.
We further proposed a simplified iterative algorithm to settle
the convex optimization problems, and obtained a closed-form
solution of the precoders. Taylor expansion has been utilized
to transform the non-convex problems into convex ones. Sim-
ulation results showed that the proposed power-minimization
problem outperforms the DJS in power efficiency, and the RJS
and RPS perform much better than DJS and NJS in terms
of the SER. Meanwhile, the proposed algorithm significantly
improved the computation efficiency of the SLP problems.
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